http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/politics/18offenders.html

Quote :

"In a broad endorsement of federal power, the Supreme Court on Monday ruled that Congress has the authority under the Constitution to allow the continued civil commitment of sex offenders after they have completed their criminal sentences. "

full opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1224.pdf

Choice Quotes (emphasis mine):

Quote :

" It makes clear that grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are “convenient, or useful” or “con ducive” to the enumerated power’s “beneficial exercise,” e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413, 418, ... although the Constitution nowhere grants Congress express power to create federal crimes beyond those specifi cally enumerated, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, or to maintain the secu rity of those who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others, Congress possesses broad authority to do each of those things under the Clause. Pp. 5–9. ... If the Government proves its claims by “clear and con vincing evidence,” the court will order the prisoner’s con tinued commitment in “the custody of the Attorney Gen eral,” who must “make all reasonable efforts to cause” the State where that person was tried, or the State where he is domiciled, to “assume responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment.” ... The Government sought certiorari, and we granted its request, limited to the question of Congress’ authority under Art. I, §8 of the Constitution. Pet. for Cert. i. [note: basically although they can still fight the actual confinement, these guys do have to start all over again ... To be sure, as we have previously acknowledged, “The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Govern ment by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.” New York, 505 U. S., at 157. ... The Court’s discussion of the Tenth Amendment invites the inference that restrictions flowing from the federal system are of no import when defining the limits of the National Government’s power, as it pro ceeds by first asking whether the power is within the National Government’s reach, and if so it discards federal ism concerns entirely. These remarks explain why the Court ignores important limitations stemming from federalism principles. Those principles are essential to an understanding of the func tion and province of the States in our constitutional structure. [note: even in the concurring opinions, they acknowledge a failure to address reasonable concerns] ... JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment. I am concerned about the breadth of the Court’s lan guage, see ante, at 2–4 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judg ment), and the ambiguity of the standard that the Court applies, see post, at 9 (THOMAS, J., dissenting), but I am persuaded, on narrow grounds, that it was “necessary and proper” for Congress to enact the statute at issue in this case, 18 U. S. C. §4248, in order to “carr[y] into Execution” powers specifically conferred on Congress by the Constitu tion, see Art. I, §8, cl. 18. ... The only additional question presented here is whether, in order to carry into execution the enumerated powers on which the federal criminal laws rest, it is also necessary and proper for Congress to protect the public from dangers created by the federal criminal justice and prison systems. In my view, the answer to that question is “yes.” Just as it is necessary and proper for Congress to provide for the apprehension of escaped federal prisoners, it is necessary and proper for Congress to provide for the civil commit ment of dangerous federal prisoners who would otherwise escape civil commitment as a result of federal imprison ment. [note: probably the most reasonable thing I've read so far, even if I disagree with it] ... Now for some dissent The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact only those laws that “carr[y] into Execution” one or more of the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution. Art. I, §8, cl. 18. Because §4248 “Execut[es]” no enumerated power, I must respect fully dissent. ... First, the law must be directed toward a “legitimate” end, which McCulloch defines as one “within the scope of the [C]onstitution”—that is, the powers ex pressly delegated to the Federal Government by some provision in the Constitution. Second, there must be a necessary and proper fit between the “means” (the federal law) and the “end” (the enumerated power or powers) it is designed to serve. Ibid. McCulloch accords Congress a certain amount of discretion in assessing means-end fit under this second inquiry. The means Congress selects will be deemed “necessary” if they are “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to the exercise of an enumerated power, and “proper” if they are not otherwise “prohibited” by the Constitution and not “[in]consistent” with its “letter and spirit.” Ibid. ... Unless the end itself is “legitimate,” the fit be tween means and end is irrelevant. In other words, no matter how “necessary” or “proper” an Act of Congress may be to its objective, Congress lacks authority to legis late if the objective is anything other than “carrying into Execution” one or more of the Federal Government’s enu merated powers. Art. I, §8, cl. 18. ..."

[Edited on May 17, 2010 at 9:35 PM. Reason : more]

5/17/2010 9:35:04 PM

Quote :

" ... Statements by delegates to the state ratification conventions indicate that this understanding was widely held by the founding generation. E.g., id., at 245–246 (statement of George Nicholas) (“Suppose [the Necessary and Proper Clause] had been inserted, at the end of every power, that they should have power to make laws to carry that power into execution; would that have increased their powers? If, therefore, it could not have increased their powers, if placed at the end of each power, it cannot in crease them at the end of all”).2 ... Indeed, not even the Commerce Clause—the enumerated power this Court has interpreted most expansively, see, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937)—can justify federal civil detention of sex offenders. Under the Court’s precedents, Congress may not regulate noneconomic activity (such as sexual violence) based solely on the effect such activity may have, in individual cases or in the aggregate, on interstate commerce. ... Indeed, it is clear, on the face of the Act and in the Government’s arguments urging its constitutionality, that §4248 is aimed at protecting society from acts of sexual violence, not toward “carrying into Execution” any enumerated power or powers of the Federal Government. ... But the Constitution does not vest in Congress the authority to protect society from every bad act that might befall it.6 ... At a minimum, this shift from the two-step McCulloch framework to this five consideration approach warrants an explanation as to why McCulloch is no longer good enough and which of the five considerations will bear the most weight in future cases, assuming some number less than five suffices. (Or, if not, why all five are required.) The Court provides no answers to these questions. ... But in citing these cases, the Court puts the cart before the horse: The fit between means and ends matters only if the end is in fact legitimate—i.e., only if it is one of the Federal Govern ment’s enumerated powers. By starting its inquiry with the degree of deference owed to Congress in selecting means to further a legiti mate end, the Court bypasses McCulloch’s first step and fails carefully to examine whether the end served by §4248 is actually one of those powers. See Part III–A–2, infra. ... the Court surveys other laws Con gress has enacted and concludes that, because §4248 is related to those laws, the “links” between §4248 and an enumerated power are not “too attenuated”; hence, §4248 is a valid exercise of Congress’ Necessary and Proper Clause authority. Ante, at 18. This unnecessarily con fuses the analysis and, if followed to its logical extreme, would result in an unwarranted expansion of federal power. ... But that is not the question. The Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide Congress with authority to enact any law simply because it furthers other laws Con gress has enacted in the exercise of its incidental author ity; the Clause plainly requires a showing that every federal statute “carr[ies] into Execution” one or more of the Federal Government’s enumerated powers.8 ... First, the statute’s definition of a “sexually dangerous person” contains no element relating to the subject’s crime. See §§4247(a)(5)–(6). It thus does not require a federal court to find any connection between the reasons supporting civil commitment and the enumerated power with which that person’s criminal conduct interfered. As a consequence, §4248 allows a court to civilly commit an individual without finding that he was ever charged with or convicted of a federal crime involving sexual violence. §§4248(a), (d). That possibility is not merely hypothetical: The Government concedes that nearly 20% of individuals against whom §4248 proceedings have been brought fit this description.9 Tr. of Oral Arg. 23–25. ... The statute therefore authorizes federal custody over a person at a time when the Government would lack juris diction to detain him for violating a criminal law that executes an enumerated power. ... Restatement (Second) of Torts §319, p. 129 (1963–1964), that duty terminates once the legal basis for custody expires: “There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless “(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or “(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protec tion.” Id., §315, at 122. Once the Federal Government’s criminal jurisdiction over a prisoner ends, so does any “special relation[ship]” be tween the Government and the former prisoner.12 ... The historical record thus supports the Federal Gov ernment’s authority to detain a mentally ill person against whom it has the authority to enforce a criminal law. But it provides no justification whatsoever for reading the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant Congress the power to authorize the detention of persons without a basis for federal criminal jurisdiction. ... This right of first refusal is mere window dressing. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (“It is not the usual course that the State does take responsibil ity”). More importantly, it is an altogether hollow assur ance that §4248 preserves the principle of dual sover eignty—the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution—as the Necessary and Proper Clause requires.16 ... Nevertheless, 29 States appear as amici and argue that §4248 is constitutional. They tell us that they do not object to Congress retaining custody of “sexually danger ous persons” after their criminal sentences expire because the cost of detaining such persons is “expensive”— approximately $64,000 per year—and these States would rather the Federal Government bear this expense. ... Congress’ power, however, is fixed by the Constitution; it does not expand merely to suit the States’ policy prefer ences, or to allow State officials to avoid difficult choices regarding the allocation of state funds. "

Needless to say, I think 7 of our supreme court justices need to go back and reread the constitution a few times. I've said it before and I'll say it again, if a person has committed a crime that you feel makes them a danger, even after they are released, then lock them up for life the first time. We need to stop imposing penalties and punishments after the fact.

5/17/2010 9:35:39 PM

welcome to humanity

i do think though that the legal system in its current form can't properly handle sex offenders. The hypocrisy is sex offense laws is merely a symptom of this perhaps, and not themselves a problem. They are more of a stop-gap solution until someone figures out what the real issue is. I have never read or heard about a logically consistent solution to handling sex offenders.

I have heard though that sex offense recidivism is not much higher in actuality than other crimes, and it's more the moral outrage of sex offender crimes that causes people to treat them so differently.

5/17/2010 9:38:43 PM

When the revolution comes, its leaders will be framed as sex offenders.

5/17/2010 9:40:52 PM

activist judges

5/17/2010 9:55:05 PM

can't wait to read back through this thread and see who the closet sex offenders are, based on their posts

5/17/2010 10:14:36 PM

i thought the supreme court was finish off this ruling by saying....





yo homes to bel air!

5/17/2010 10:24:15 PM

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126894305&ft=1&f=1001

Supreme Court rejects life without parole for juveniles in non-homicide cases

Quote :

"Terrence Graham was 16 when he took part in a robbery during which an accomplice hit a restaurant manager with a pipe. After serving a year in jail, Graham was released on probation. Six months later, he was arrested while fleeing from police in connection with another armed robbery. The judge, finding that Graham had violated parole by running from the police, this time sentenced him to the maximum permissible for the original crime — life in prison without parole. Juveniles Are Less Culpable The Supreme Court declared that imposing such a penalty on a juvenile offender who has not killed anyone is so harsh and disproportionate in the context of the rest of the criminal justice system, that it violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. "

Not a failure IMO

5/18/2010 12:29:11 AM

JUSTICE SERVED!

Quote :

"Gov. Bev Perdue on Friday pardoned a man who was exonerated of a woman's murder in a groundbreaking innocence hearing in February. A special three-judge panel found Greg Taylor innocent of the murder of Jacquetta Thomas, whose beaten body was found at the end of a Raleigh cul-de-sac in 1991. Taylor was arrested when he went to retrieve his Nissan Pathfinder from some nearby woods, where it was stuck. He served more than 16 years in prison before the panel vacated his sentence. [...] Taylor was already celebrating something special on Friday. It was his daughter's birthday. "The last time I was free on my daughter's birthday, she turned 9 years old," he said."

http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7647384/
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7063377/

5/22/2010 8:12:05 AM

Well, it's good that we actually are freeing him, it's appalling that it took this long, that he will probably receive very limited remuneration for his time spent in prison, and there is nothing that can be done to help him recapture the time lost.

5/22/2010 12:08:44 PM

He could potentially get $750k, which works out to about $47k/yr before taxes.

I wonder how much they tax a lump sum payment of that size?

5/22/2010 12:19:53 PM

It's tax free actually. And he was released not due to "justice", but because it was politically beneficial.

5/22/2010 1:29:44 PM