Quote :

"I was in al Basra province when I saw news reports claiming that Basra city had descended into chaos in the wake of an announcement about the draw down of British Soldiers. I emailed the facts about Basra to several bloggers who hold the media accountable, and the resulting effort got the attention of Tom Foreman who anchors CNN's "This Week at War." We were able to make a CNN interview, and the result is a segment that accurately reflects a complex and changing situation. Bravo to CNN for setting the record straight, and to the tireless bloggers who are making a substantial difference in the way news about the war is delivered. There are major developments to share with readers in upcoming dispatches. If things go at-least-mostly according to plan (which is all we can hope for in war), and if I can rely on the help of readers who share my frustration with the lack of accurate reporting, we can significantly widen the stream of news flowing from Iraq so more people can obtain a truer picture. This will require the will and generosity of readers. But more on that, soon. Michael Basra, Iraq"

10/16/2007 4:20:01 PM

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/totten/1100

Quote :

"The Shia Awakening I have a short piece up at Commentary about Iraq's Shia Awakening. "

-Michael Totten

10/18/2007 9:06:27 AM

Quote :

"19 October 07 Michael Yon notes: I have just wrapped up a very interesting trip with British soldiers in southern Iraq. We spent much time in mine fields near the Iranian border. The area looked like a stairwell to hell. Numerous dispatches about the Brits and southern Iraq are on the way. Am currently back with American combat forces in Baghdad. "

I think it will be interesting to see his reports on southern Iraq as they compare to what the media is reporting.

Hes already said its much calmer than the media lets on. How much stability do you guys think really exists.

Note: Attempting a discussion. May god have mercy on my soul.


Also, here is an article that the liberals will like. Makes some good jabs at the white house.

Posted along with the update above,

Quote :

"Joe Galloway sends another column. Though I sharply disagree with much of what Joe writes, I always read his opinions: By Joseph L. Galloway October 17, 2007 McClatchy Newspapers One of America’s more thoughtful military strategists, retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, a veteran of ground combat in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, says that our “defense strategy is unbalanced, incoherent and underfunded.” McCaffrey made his comments and recommendations in a six-page analysis addressed to professors at West Point, where he’s an adjunct professor of international relations. For someone who spent his entire career in Army green, from West Point to four stars, McCaffrey found that U.S. defense modernization dollars and manpower resources are being poured into a rat-hole, or as he put it, “the ground combat meat-grinder,” of the war in Iraq at the rate of $12 billion a month. What’s being sacrificed, the general wrote, is future control of the vital air and sea-lanes and operational maneuver areas surrounding regional Pacific allies such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia, as well as the Alaskan sea frontier. McCaffrey said the greatest challenge to America’s national security and foreign policy in the next 15 years will come with “the certain emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a global economic and political power with the military muscle to challenge and neutralize the deterrence capacity of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the broad reaches of the Pacific maritime frontier.” He added that China will soon have the military capacity to pose a survival threat to American defensive capabilities, as well as to our ability to project power along the Pacific littoral. By 2020, the general wrote, we’ll also be facing a resurgence of the military power projection capabilities of the Russian Federation and the emergence of other regional maritime and air powers _ India, Iran, Pakistan and Japan. McCaffrey said he fears that as the Iraq disaster unwinds over the next 36 months, “We may swing from the eerie immaturity of the Rumsfeld era focus on the magic of technology as the sole determinant of national security to an equally disastrous concentration on building a ground combat force which could have won Iraq from the start _ absent the bad judgment of the Rumsfeld Pentagon and compliant generals.” “We should create a U.S. National Security policy based principally on the deterrence capabilities of a dominant global Air Force and Naval presence,” McCaffrey wrote, adding that the money to do this with can’t be squeezed out of the current defense budget, which comprises only 4 percent of America’s GNP. The Air Force in particular is badly underfunded, McCaffrey noted, adding that Air Force manpower is shrinking and that its aging strike, airlift and aerial tanker fleets are being ground down by non-stop global operations. “The U.S. Air Force is our primary national strategic force . . . yet it is too small, has inadequate numbers of aging aircraft, has been marginalized in the current strategic debate and has mortgaged its modernization program to allow diversion of funds to prosecute” under-funded wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. McCaffrey said the next administration must fix all these funding shortfalls for the Air Force “or we will place the American people in enormous peril.” The general’s focus in his report was on the Air Force, but he argued that the U.S. Army, with a total active duty force of more than 500,000 troops, is far too small and should be rebuilt to 800,000 troops. He noted that the Army National Guard has critical equipment shortages; ammunition and equipment reserves have been drawn down and used up in Iraq; the special operations forces are stretched to the breaking point; and training for the full range of possible combat missions has been halted for three years. When McCaffrey sounds the alarm, it’s time to begin paying attention. He doesn’t scare easily, and he doesn’t cry wolf unless one is chewing on his leg. If anyone besides George W. Bush and Dick Cheney still thinks that invading Iraq was a good idea, consider that to date it’s cost our nation $600 billion and that hidden future costs could bring that to as much as $2 trillion even if the war ended tomorrow. That’s money that might have been better spent on a host of domestic priorities, including reinforcing and re-equipping a military force capable of defending America and its allies now and in an uncertain future, one that’s been made far more dangerous by the mistakes of a bunch of incompetent amateurs. "

[Edited on October 19, 2007 at 7:43 AM. Reason : dd]

10/19/2007 7:33:52 AM

Michael Yon is attempting to get the truth about the facts from the ground to people around the world. This article defines the problem with the media and the consequences of their lack of reporting accurately on Iraq.

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/resistance-is-futile.htm

10/22/2007 10:25:06 AM

Question:

Do you think we will ever pull out of Iraq before it can support itself? As in, we basically let it consume itself.

Realistically, if things continue to improve like they are, by the time Bush is out of the office, there wont be many US deaths at all.

10/24/2007 9:02:06 PM

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/beauchamp-and-the-rule-of-second-chances.htm

Anyone actually go to this thread, or do you check the pages yourself.

10/25/2007 4:14:43 PM

my guess is neither, which is what we told you before

10/25/2007 4:21:23 PM

don't encourage him.

10/25/2007 4:23:43 PM

10/25/2007 4:46:07 PM

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/iraqi-islamic-party-says-al-qaeda-is-defeated.htm

Some other new dispatches in the dispatch section.

Things are looking better and better.

11/1/2007 8:10:16 AM

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/totten/1196

Good article about reporting what the army wants you to see and such.

11/1/2007 2:37:45 PM

Image from this Dispatch on the power of pictures.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/consumer-reports-geared-for-combat.htm

Quote :

"This photograph, taken in May 2005, in Mosul, after a car bomb detonated in the middle of a group of children who’d gathered around the soldiers and their vehicles, resonates with many people. Readers alert me to the ongoing attempts to “borrow” it to promote organizations that are both pro-military and those that are vehemently anti-war. Candidates from all political parties have asked to use it, but I won’t allow it to be used for any political purpose. People read “facts” into the photograph, despite that all the relevant ones have been in the dispatch titled “Little Girl” since it was first published in May, 2005."

Quote :

"During roughly my first seven months in Iraq, I shot with the Nikon D70. That D70 is the best camera for the money I have owned. The photos can be stunning. The photo above was the TIME Magazine Photo of the Year (readers’ choice category) in 2005, and more than two years after shooting the photo, requests to use it are constant. After the photo was released, Iraqis responded and called in tips on terrorists. Later I learned that the terrorists stopped intentionally targeting kids because the photo damaged the terrorists badly. This is an example of a positive outcome of a photo."

11/5/2007 1:08:33 PM

Quote :

"Thanks and Praise: I photographed men and women, both Christians and Muslims, placing a cross atop the St. John’s Church in Baghdad. They had taken the cross from storage and a man washed it before carrying it up to the dome."

Quote :

"A Muslim man had invited the American soldiers from “Chosen” Company 2-12 Cavalry to the church, where I videotaped as Muslims and Christians worked and rejoiced at the reopening of St John’s, an occasion all viewed as a sign of hope. The Iraqis asked me to convey a message of thanks to the American people. ” Thank you, thank you,” the people were saying. One man said, “Thank you for peace.” Another man, a Muslim, said “All the people, all the people in Iraq, Muslim and Christian, is brother.” The men and women were holding bells, and for the first time in memory freedom rang over the ravaged land between two rivers. (Videotape to follow.) "

11/8/2007 8:49:33 AM

Now that, ladies and gentlemen, is awesome to see. I can only hope it propagates.

11/8/2007 9:00:17 AM

Not especially related to this thread, but I was driving across the Boylan bridge today and saw a train that was carrying at least 100 up-armored humvees with the ballistic glass and the armored gunner perch. They were headed north - I assume to Norfolk to be shipped over.

It's good to know that we're cranking out more of those.

11/8/2007 2:38:53 PM

11/8/2007 5:44:44 PM

Well, I am having a really hard time finding any real news on Iraq. This is most likely due to the sharp reduction in the violence. The only stories I have found on the main news sites is generally mentioning that its quiet and calm (for the most part) but the enemies are just regrouping!

Anyone got anything notable?

11/14/2007 6:33:13 PM

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/come-home.htm

Good dispatch about what christians are left in Baghdad

11/16/2007 6:38:14 PM

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/men-of-valor-part-ii.htm

Good one about the british men of valor

11/26/2007 12:47:36 PM

http://www.michaeltotten.com/


Fallujah as it exists today

[Edited on November 27, 2007 at 2:31 PM. Reason : dd]

11/27/2007 2:27:17 PM

Very good battle in this continuation of the British in Basra series

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/men-of-valor-part-iii.htm

11/29/2007 1:16:24 PM

I have a bad feeling that the recent letup by insurgents is just a new plan ... make it look like everything is under control by laying back for a while, giving the US a "clean escape" from Iraq that makes them feel good politically, and then..


BAM!! ... back into power in 1 weeks time.

Say it aint so, please

11/29/2007 1:51:10 PM

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/sheik-twitty-al-ameriki.htm

Mosul is being secured with 1% of our total forces and it is one o fthe largest cities.

The surge is creating a more stable enviornment where we can free up more soilders in general and keep less and less in the stable places and concentrate on the problem areas.

I like this.

12/3/2007 8:55:32 AM

Totten's article about Fallujah.

http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2007/12/02/2007-12-02_what_i_see_every_day_in_iraq_locals_turn.html?print=1&page=all

12/3/2007 10:01:50 AM

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/infrastructure-to-mraps.htm

Small dispatch about the targeting of infrastructure.

12/5/2007 10:57:46 AM

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/men-of-valor-part-iv.htm



Part 4

12/6/2007 3:15:48 PM

http://www.michaeltotten.com/

Long dispatch with more about Fallujah

12/10/2007 10:18:43 AM

Quote :

""

I've played that map on CoD4.

12/10/2007 10:21:52 AM

Battlefield 2 > CoD4

12/10/2007 2:04:36 PM

Quote :

"Doura Progress Report 1-4 CAV Update #8 by LTC Jim Crider DEC 07 Despite the hardships associated with our current deployment there are many things that are personally rewarding. Undoubtedly, when we return to Fort Riley we will do so with an enormous sense of accomplishment as a team and personal satisfaction as individual soldiers. In our area it is indisputable that we have set the conditions for political progress and are working hard to move forward on the local level. The current situation is not irreversible as there are certainly those with designs for power looking for opportunities to return to chaos. I do find that our Iraqi friends enjoy living a closer to normal life with an increased sense of hope and therein lay our own hope that all sacrifice has not been in vain. We know the heavy price that was paid to get us to this point and we must be prepared to follow through. Recently, a close Iraqi friend remarked that reconciliation was not needed between Sunni and Shia but between the people of Iraq and their government. For the past few days we have hosted media embeds from the New York Times and the USA Today. We also brought down Iraqi television recently to show them the progress we have made in Doura. When I met the Iraqi reporter in the Green Zone he was visibly nervous and asked if we had any active snipers in the neighborhoods where we planned to travel. Not surprisingly, he was by himself as his partner failed to show likely out of fear. We reassured him as he admitted that he had not been to Doura since before the war. Once we arrived he saw the streets full of families, vegetable markets, new sidewalks, remodeled schools, parks, and some very nice murals on the walls. As it turned out, we could hardly keep up with him as he interviewed over twenty people on the street and in their cars about the situation. This is important in our current strategy as we spread the news even within the city of Baghdad about real progress. In the past, the Iraqi Government has used security as an excuse for inactivity so the media can help remove that misconception. I spent an entire day with our American reporters and photographers who are genuinely interested in what is really happening here. Their assignment was to write about several topics to include the new MRAP vehicle, breaking up IED cells, and our concerned local citizens groups. By the end of the day, I think they really felt like a story on our progress was needed. We will see what happens but here are some things they saw. They did see concerned local citizens taking an increased role in the security of their neighborhood under our supervision and in coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces. These men stand unafraid and most hope to become part of the Iraqi Police one day soon. We walked through a game room full of young people playing one another in a networked Play Station game. Across the way we then came upon some men putting together some pool tables in a new game room. They saw children gathered around every American Soldier speaking broken English and coaching our guys through some broken Arabic. At the end of the day, though, we really witnessed a local milestone event. The National Police played a team of local citizens in a game of soccer. If you recall, when we arrived in Doura the National Police (a largely Shia dominated organization) and the citizens of Doura exchanged gunfire on a daily basis. We literally had to remove the National Police from the neighborhoods and enforce a cease fire, if you will, until we could begin to help both groups build a relationship. On the afternoon of December 8th, I sat with the NP Brigade commander and other neighborhood leaders as we all watched a friendly, competitive soccer match and most importantly we took one step closer to not going back to the way things were. After the game, both teams posed for pictures and spontaneous applause broke out. Oh, the game ended in a 2-2 tie. We continue to adjust to the changes in our area that come along with increased security like more traffic. It takes us longer to travel and we now drive along with the traffic much more than in the past. We also see a significant amount of resettlement where original home owners are returning to their homes often to find another family living there. By and large this is an issue we allow the Iraqis to work out. Fortunately, the real estate offices keep pretty good records and we have had good cooperation so far. We are seeing more involvement by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society as well as the Life Makers Association for Widows and Orphans which is an Iraqi charitable organization supported by Iraqis living in other countries. It is undeniable that things are heading in the right direction but we certainly have work to do. We do spend a great deal of time as mediators as well as catalysts for change and forward movement. We all greatly appreciate your support especially as the holiday season approaches. Please remember our recovering soldiers at Brook Army Medical Center in San Antonio. I took the opportunity to visit them recently while on my way home for leave and it was inspirational. Merry Christmas and Happy New year! PREPARED AND LOYAL! LTC Jim Crider"

12/11/2007 8:10:19 AM

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/welcome-home-well-done.htm

Apparantly there has been a turn around in the British media with regards to the troops in Iraq

12/11/2007 12:24:20 PM

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/general-barry-r-mccaffrey-report.htm


Now this is a hell of a summary. ENJOY!

Quote :

"General Barry R McCaffrey Report Adjunct Professor of International Affairs December 18, 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Michael Meese Professor and Head Dept of Social Sciences United States Military Academy CC: Colonel Cindy Jebb Professor and Deputy Head Dept of Social Sciences United States Military Academy SUBJECT: After Action Report—General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) VISIT IRAQ AND KUWAIT 5-11 DECEMBER 2007 1. PURPOSE: This memo provides feedback on my strategic and operational assessment of current security operations in Iraq. Look forward to providing lectures to faculty and cadet national security seminars. Will provide follow-on comprehensive report with attachments of current unclassified data and graphs documenting the current counter-insurgency situation in Iraq."

12/20/2007 12:34:02 PM

Anyone that ignores this thread really needs to read ^ article.

12/20/2007 12:53:36 PM

^^I feel the need to post that article here.

Quote :

"General Barry R McCaffrey Report Adjunct Professor of International Affairs December 18, 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Michael Meese Professor and Head Dept of Social Sciences United States Military Academy CC: Colonel Cindy Jebb Professor and Deputy Head Dept of Social Sciences United States Military Academy SUBJECT: After Action Report—General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) VISIT IRAQ AND KUWAIT 5-11 DECEMBER 2007 1. PURPOSE: This memo provides feedback on my strategic and operational assessment of current security operations in Iraq. Look forward to providing lectures to faculty and cadet national security seminars. Will provide follow-on comprehensive report with attachments of current unclassified data and graphs documenting the current counter-insurgency situation in Iraq. 2. SOURCES: 1.) ADM William (Fox) Fallon USN, Commander US Central Command (CENTCOM) One-one-one meeting in Iraq. Theater strategic assessment. 2.) GEN David Petraeus, Commanding General Multi-National Forces Iraq (CG, MNF-I) One-on-one office call: strategic assessment. 3.) LTG Raymond Odierno, Commanding General Multi-National Corps-Iraq (CG, MNC-I) Campaign briefing. 4.) LTG Jim Dubik, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command -Iraq (MNSTC-I) MNSTC-I Overview brief and ministerial capacity discussion “Building the Iraqi Police and Army”. 5.) Chargé Ambassador Pat Butenis, Deputy Chief of Mission (Ambassador Ryan Crocker on personal leave) One-on-one diplomatic assessment. 6.) MG John Paxton USMC, Chief of Staff Multi National Forces- Iraq (COS, MNF-I) MNF-I Battle Update Assessment. 7.) MG Joe Fil, Commanding General, Multi-National Division -Baghdad (CG, MND-B) Update- “The struggle for Bagdad.” 8.) MG Mark Hertling, Commanding General Multi-National Division- North (CG, MND-N) MND-N “Battle Update Brief the northern zones…AQI final refuge.” 9.) MG Rick Lynch, Commanding General Multi-National Division Center-(CG, MND-C) MND-C Operations & Intelligence Round Table. “The struggle for the southern approaches to Baghdad.” 10.) MG Mike Jones, Commander Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) Round table discussion at Taqaddam Airbase. “Building the Iraqi Police.” 11.) MG Kevin Bergner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects, MNF-I Update briefing with senior MNF-I Staff. 12.) MG Maston Robeson (Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Plans and Assessments MNF-I), RADML Greg Smith (PAOMNF-I): Update briefing with senior MNF-I Staff. 13.) MG Dennis Hardy, Deputy Commanding General, Third Army, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT), Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC): Briefing on strategic situation in Kuwait. 14.) BG Geoff Freeman, CG, 335th Theater Sig Cmd (Prov), C6, Coalition Forces Land Component Command: Update briefing on communications support, Iraq and Afghanistan. 15.) US Embassy Baghdad Country Team Briefing – AMB Marci Ries (Pol-Mil Counselor), AMB Charlie Ries (Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq), Todd Schwartz (Economic Counselor), Matt Tueller (Political Counselor), Dr. Chris Schnaubelt (Chief of Joint Strategic Plans and Assessments). 16.) BG Jim Yarbrough, CG, Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG): Update briefing MNC-I assistance group. “The status and training of US MiTT teams imbedded in Iraqi Forces.” 17.) Operational Intelligence Briefings. BG (P) Vince Brooks (DCG S, MND-B), COL Jack Ballantyne (Chief of Staff and MND-B), COL Bill West (Chief ISF Cell, MND-B), LTC Steve North (G2, MND-B), LTC Chris Bonheim (Deputy G3, MND-B): “Iraqi Forces engaged in the struggle for Baghdad.” 18.) Campaign briefing with MNC-I CG Team. COL Jerry Tait (C2, MNC-I), COL John Murray (C3, MNC-I), COL J.T. Thomson (XO, MNC-I CG) “The campaign Plan.” 19.) Sensing session and open discussion with thirty-eight US battalion commanders: MND-B Battalion Commander’s Conference. Working Lunch — BG John Campbell, DCG (S). 20.) BG Barry McManus (Joint Headquarters Transition Team CMATT), BG Robert Allardice (Air Force Transition Team CMATT), and RADM Edward Winters (Navy Transition Team CMATT), and COL Al Dochnal (Chief of Staff CMATT): MNSTC-I Overview Brief Iraqi: Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity Discussion 21.) BG Jim Kessler, CG 2nd Marine Logistic Group MNF-W, COL Rivers Johnson (PAO, CPATT), Mr. Don Lane (Chief of Training CPATT): Round Table Discussion. (Forced down by dust storm weather with the Marines!) 22.) BG Edward Cardon, DCG-S, MND-C: MND-C Battle Update Brief. 23.) BG Charles Gurganus USMC (CG Ground Component Element, II MEF), COL John Charlton USA (Commander 1st Bde, MNF-W), and COL Dave Fuquea USMC (G3-ISF MNF-W): Overview, Ramadi city visits, and working lunch Marine/US Army leadership Camp Ramadi. 24.) COL Jim Hickey, (Director, MNC-I COIC), MAJ Brian Bricker (XO, MNC-I COIC): Office call with MNC-I Counter-IED Operational Integration Center. “Strategic intelligence assessment.” 25.) COL Ricky Gibbs, (Commander 4/1 ID), LTC Pat Frank (Commander 1-28 IN): 4/1 ID BCT & 1-28 IN “O&I Brief with focus on the battle for Baghdad.” (US 80 KIA and 600+ WIA in this brigade during the campaign.) 26.) COL Rodger Cloutier (G3 MND-C), MAJ David Waldron (G3 Ops MND-C), MAJ David Stender (720th MP Bn S3), MAJ Michael Kelly (G3 ISF Cell MND-C): Lunch & Brief on Iraqi Security Forces Status & Readiness on the southern approaches to Baghdad.” 27.) COL Dominic Caracillo (Commander, 3/101 ABN), LTC Andrew Rohling (Commander, 3-187 IN), COL Ahmad (Iraqi Battalion Commander PB Kemple): Visit with 3rd BCT, 101 ABN at Patrol Base Kemple. “The battle for the southern approaches to Baghdad.” 28.) COL Wayne Grigsby (Commander 3rd Bde, 3ID), MAJ Luis Rivera (XO, 1-10 FA Bn), and CPT Pat Moffett (Commander, A/1-10 FA Bn): Battle updates “the southern belt” …“market walk Iraqi City” with 3rd Bde, 3ID 29.) COL Bryan Watson (Chief of Staff, MND-N), COL Steve Schenk (G3 MND-N): MND-N Battle Update briefs the northern zones. 30.) COL John Broadmedow USMC, Chief 7th IA Division MiTT: 7th IA Division Mitt Overview& Discussion at Camp Black Diamond. “The reconciliation campaign for Anbar province.” 31.) COL Steve Schenk (G3 MND-N), MAJ Sam Lex (G3-ISF MND-N): Meeting with MND-N Iraqi Security Forces Cell. 32.) COL Jessie Farrington (Commander 1st CAB), LTC Jim Cutting (Commander, TF Odin), MAJ Bill Huff (Brigade S3, 1st CAB): 1st Combat Aviation Brigade and TF Odin Briefing– Tikrit. 33.) LTC Thomas Hauerwas (Bde XO 1/101st ABN), MAJ George Bratcher (Bde S2, 1/101st ABN): 1/101st ABN Operations and Intelligence Update “the southern approaches.” 34.) Round table discussion with International Police Advisors: Donald Lane (Chief of Training CPATT), Steve Ryan, International Police Advisor, Habbaniyah, Dave Smith, International Police Advisor, Ed Weibl, International Police Advisor. “Effectiveness of the Iraqi Police.” 35.) MG Tariq Yusuf, Anbar Provincial Chief of Police: Operational assessment at Ramadi Government Center. 36.) Meeting/ briefing with 7th Iraqi Army Division Commander and senior staff. “The struggle for Anbar Province.” 37.) Sensing Session with twenty US Company Commanders. Multi National Division North. “Morale, career plans, performance of Iraqi Security Forces, trust in Commanders.” 38.) Field visit 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, MAJ Eric Weis, S3. (Serve as honorary Colonel of the regiment. Was honored to present awards for valor and purple heart medals, as well as receive update brief on their counter-insurgency operations south of Baghdad.) 39.) Visit Public Market Place. MND Center. Narhwan, Iraq (Population 100,000) 40.) Visit “Concerned Local Citizens” security group. MND Center. 41.) Visit Iraq Police Station. Ramadi, Iraq. 42.) Visit Iraq Police. MND Bagdad, Iraq. 43.) Visit Iraq Army. MND Bagdad, Iraq. 44.) Visit Iraq Regional Training Center. Police & Army. Habbaniyah, Iraq "

12/20/2007 2:41:21 PM

Quote :

"1. THE BOTTOM LINE—AN OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT: a. VIOLENCE DOWN DRAMATICALLY: The struggle for stability in the Iraqi Civil War has entered a new phase with dramatically reduced levels of civilian sectarian violence, political assassinations, abductions, and small arms/ indirect fire and IED attacks on US and Iraqi Police and Army Forces. This is the unmistakable new reality —and must be taken into account as the US debates its options going forward. The national security debate must move on to an analysis of why this new political and security situation exists—not whether it exists. General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker have provided brilliant collective leadership to US Forces and have ably engaged the Iraqi political and military leadership. b. AL QAEDA TACTICALLY DEFEATED AND TRYING TO REGENERATE: Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been defeated at a tactical and operational level in Baghdad and Anbar Province and is trying to re-constitute in the north and along the Syrian frontier. The Iraqi people have turned on AQI because it overreached trying to impose an alien and harsh practice of Islam inconsistent with the more moderate practices of the Sunni minority. (16% of the population.) The foreign jihadist elements in AQI (with their enormous hatred of what they view as the apostate Shia) have alienated the nationalism of the broader Iraqi population. Foreign intervention across the Syrian frontier has dropped substantially. Most border-crossers are suicide bombers who are dead within four days while carrying out largely ineffective attacks on the civilian population and the Iraqi Police. The senior leaders of AQI have become walking dead men because of the enormous number of civilian intelligence tips coming directly to US Forces. US and Brit Special Operations Forces are deadly against AQI leadership. Essentially AQI has been driven out of Baghdad and is now trying to reconstitute their capabilities. c. IRAQI SECURITY FORCES KEY FACTOR IN SUCCESSFUL INTERNAL SECURITY: The Iraqi Security Forces are now beginning to take a major and independent successful role in the war. Under the determined leadership of LTG Jim Dubik —both the equipment and force levels of the Iraqi Security Forces are now for the first time in the war at a realistic level of resource planning. The previously grossly ineffective and corrupt Iraqi Police have been forcefully re-trained and re-equipped. The majority of their formerly sectarian police leadership has been replaced. The police are now a mixed bag— but many local units are now effectively providing security and intelligence penetration of their neighborhoods. The Iraqi Army has made huge progress in leadership, training, and equipment capability. The embedded US training teams have simply incredible levels of trust and mutual cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts. Corruption remains endemic. However, much remains to be done. This is the center-of-gravity of the war. The ISF still lacks credibility as a coherent counter-insurgency and deterrent force. It has no national logistics and maintenance system. It lacks any semblance of an Air Force with a robust lift and attack helicopter force and fixed wing C-130 lift to support counter-insurgency. It lacks any semblance of a functioning military medical system to provide country-wide trauma care, evacuation, and rehabilitation. It lacks any artillery with precision munitions to provide stand-off attack of hard targets—or to assist in counter-battery fire to protect the population and military installations. It lacks any serious armor capability to act as a deterrent force to protect national sovereignty. (In my judgment the Army needs 9000+ wheel and track armored vehicles for their 13 combat divisions.) "

12/20/2007 2:41:56 PM

Quote :

"d. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WORK: There is no functional central Iraqi Government. Incompetence, corruption, factional paranoia, and political gridlock have paralyzed the state. The constitution promotes bureaucratic stagnation and factional strife. The budgetary process cannot provide responsive financial support to the military and the police—nor local government for health, education, governance, reconstruction, and transportation. Mr. Maliki has no political power base and commands no violent militias who have direct allegiance to him personally—making him a non-player in the Iraqi political struggle for dominance in the post-US withdrawal period which looms in front of the Iraqi people. However, there is growing evidence of the successful re-constitution of local and provincial government. Elections for provincial government are vitally important to creating any possible form of functioning Iraqi state. e. POPULATION AND REFUGEES IN MISERY: There are 4 million plus dislocated Iraqis—possibly one in six citizens. Many of the intelligentsia and professional class have fled to Syria, Jordan, or abroad. 60,000 + have been murdered or died in the post-invasion violence. Medical care is primitive. Security and justice for the individual is weak. Many lack clean water or adequate food and a roof over their family. Anger and hatred for the cruelties of the ongoing Civil War overwhelm the desire for reconciliation. There is widespread disbelief that the Iraqi government can bring the country together. The people (and in particular the women) are sick of the chaotic violence and want an end to the unpredictable violence and the dislocation of the population. f. ECONOMY SHOWING SIGNS OF COMING BACK: The economy is slowly reviving— although there is massive 50% or more unemployment or under-employment. The electrical system is slowly coming back— but it is being overwhelmed by huge increases in demand as air conditioners, TV’s, and light industry load the system. The production and distribution of gasoline is increasing but is incapable of keeping up with a gigantic increase in private vehicle and truck ownership. The Iraqi currency to everyone’s astonishment is very stable and more valued than the weak US dollar. The agricultural system is under-resourced and poorly managed—it potentially could feed the population and again become a source of export currency earnings. g. US COMBAT FORCES NOW DOMINATING THE CIVIL WAR: The morale and tactical effectiveness of engaged US military forces are striking. The “surge” of five additional US Brigade Combat Teams helped. (Although we are now forced to begin an immediate drawdown because of the inadequate resources of the worldwide US Army.) These combat forces have become the most effective counter-insurgency (and forensic police investigative service) in history. LTG Ray Odierno the MNC-I Commander and his senior commanders have gotten out of their fixed bases and operate at platoon level in concert with small elements of the Iraqi Army and Police. Their aggressive tactics combined with simply brilliant use of the newly energized Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s — Superb State Department leadership and participation) for economic development have dramatically changed the tone of the war. US Forces have now unilaterally constituted some 60,000+ armed “Iraqi Concerned Local Citizen Groups” to the consternation of the Maliki Government. These CLC Groups have added immeasurably to the security of the local populations — as well as giving a paycheck to unemployed males to support their families. Although the majority of these CLC Groups are Sunnis – increasingly the concept is being extended to Shia Groups south of Baghdad. The US battalion and brigade commanders have grown up in combat with near continuous operations in the past 20 years in the Balkans, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Many of the Army combat forces are now beginning their 4th round of year+ combat tours in Iraq or Afghanistan. Many of the Marine units are now on their 5th tour of seven month combat deployments. The troops and their leaders are simply fearless—despite 34,000 US killed and wounded. The US company and battalion commanders now operate as the de facto low-level government of the Iraqi state…schools, health, roads, police, education, governance. The Iraqis tend to defer to US company and battalion commanders based on their respect for their counterparts’ energy, integrity, and the assurance of some level of security. These US combat units have enormous discretion to use CRP Funds to jump start local urban and rural economic and social reconstruction. They are rapidly mentoring and empowering local Iraqi civilian and police leadership. Direct intelligence cooperation has sky-rocketed. The civilian population provides by-name identification of criminal leadership. They point out IED’s. They directly interact with US forces at low level in much of the country. (There are still 3000+ attacks on US Forces each month…this is still a Civil War.) h. SUNNI ARABS WANT BACK IN— BEFORE US FORCES DEPART: The Sunnis Arabs have stopped seeing the US as the enemy and are now cooperating to eliminate AQI — and to position themselves for the next phase of the Civil War when the US Forces withdraw. There is no leadership that can speak for all the Sunnis. The former regime elements have now stepped forward —along with tribal leadership —to assert some emerging control. i. SHIA ARABS HOLDING IN CEASEFIRE—STRUGGLE FOR INTERNAL POWER: The Shia JAM militia under the control of Mr. Sadr have maintained their cease-fire, are giving up rogue elements to be harvested by US Special Operations teams, and are consolidating control over their ethnic cleansing success in Baghdad—as well as maneuvering to dominate the Iranian affiliated Badr brigade forces in the south. However, Mr. Sadr lost great credibility when his forces violently intervened in the Holy City of Najaf —and were videoed on national TV and throughout the Arab world carrying out criminal acts against the pilgrims and protectors of the Shia population. Sadr himself is an enigma. He may well want back into the political process. He is not a puppet of the Iranians and may lack their real support. His command and control of his own forces appears weak. He personally lacks the theological gravitas of a true Shia Islamic scholar like the venerable Sistani. He may be personally fearful of being killed or captured by ISF special operations forces if he is visibly leading inside Iraq…hence his frequent absences to Iran at the sufferance of that government. j. DOMINANCE OF CRIMINAL ELEMENTS: There is no clear emerging nation-wide Shia leadership for their 60% of the Iraqi population. It is difficult to separate either Shia or Sunni political factions from Mafia criminal elements– with a primary focus on looting the government financial system and oil wealth of the nation. In many cases neighborhoods are dominated by gangs of armed thugs who loosely legitimize their arbitrary violence by implying allegiance to a higher level militia. The Iraqi justice system…courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, police investigators, jails for pre-trial confinement, prisons for sentences, integrity of public institutions—does not yet exist. Vengeance is the only operative law of the land. The situation is starting to change. The Iraqi Police will be in charge of most neighborhoods by the end of next year. k. THE KURDS—AN AUTOMOMOUS SUCCESSFUL REGION: The Kurds are a successful separate autonomous state—with a functioning and rapidly growing economy, a strong military (Both existing Pesh Merga Forces and nominally Iraqi-Kurdish Army divisions), a free press, relative security, significant foreign investment, and a growing tourist industry which serves as a neutral and safe meeting place for separated and terrified Sunni and Shia Arab families from the south. There are Five Star hotels, airline connections to Europe, a functioning telephone system, strong trade relations with Syria, enormous mutually beneficial trade relations with Turkey, religious tolerance, a functional justice system, and an apparently enduring cease-fire between the traditional Kurdish warring factions. Kurdish adventurism and appetite to confront both their external neighbors and the Iraqi central state may have been tempered in a healthy way by the prospect of invasion from the powerful Turkish Armed Forces to avenge the continued cross-border KKP terrorism. The war-after-next will be the war of the Iraqi Arabs against the Kurds —when Mosul as well as Kirkuk and its giant oil basin (and an even greater Kurdish claimed buffer zone to the south) is finally and inevitably absorbed (IAW the existing Constitution) by the nascent Kurdish state. The only real solution to this dread inevitability is patient US diplomacy to continually defer the fateful Kurdish decision ad infinitum. "

12/20/2007 2:42:23 PM

Quote :

"2. THE WAY AHEAD: a. THE CENTRAL US MILITARY PURPOSE MUST BE TO CREATE ADEQUATE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: The Iraqis are the key variable. The center of our military effort must be the creation of well-equipped, trained, and adequately supported Iraqi Police and Army Forces with an operational Air Force and Navy. We have rapidly decreasing political leverage on the Iraqi factional leadership. It is evident that the American people have no continued political commitment to solving the Iraqi Civil War. The US Armed Forces cannot for much longer impose an internal skeleton of governance and security on 27 million warring people. The US must achieve our real political objectives to withdraw most US combat forces in the coming 36 months leaving in place: 1st: A stable Iraqi government. 2nd: A strong and responsive Iraqi security force. 3rd: A functioning economy. 4th: Some form of accountable, law-based government. 5th: A government with active diplomatic and security ties to its six neighboring states. b. THE US ARMY IS TOO SMALL AND POORLY RESOURCED TO CONTINUE SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN AT THE CURRENT LEVEL: An active counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq could probably succeed in the coming decade with twenty-five US Brigade Combat Teams. (Afghanistan probably needs two more US combat brigades for a total of four in the coming 15 year campaign to create an operational state— given more robust NATO Forces and ROE). We can probably sustain a force in Iraq indefinitely (given adequate funding) of some 10+ brigades. However, the US Army is starting to unravel. Our recruiting campaign is bringing into the Army thousands of new soldiers (perhaps 10% of the annual input) who should not be in uniform. (Criminal records, drug use, moral waivers, non-high school graduates, pregnant from Basic Training and therefore non-deployable, lowest mental category, etc.) We are losing our combat experienced mid-career NCOs’ and Captains at an excessive rate. (ROTC DMG’s, West Pointers, Officers with engineering and business degrees, etc.) Their morale is high, they are proud of their service, they have enormous personal courage—however, they see a nation of 300 million people with only an under resourced Armed Forces at war. The US Army at 400,000 troops is too small to carry out the current military strategy. The active duty US Army needs to be 800,000 strong to guarantee US national security. The National Guard and Reserves are too small, are inadequately resourced, their equipment is broken or deployed, they are beginning their second involuntary combat deployments, and they did not sign up to be a regular war-fighting force. They have done a superb job in combat but are now in peril of not being ready for serious homeland security missions or deployment to a major shooting war such as Korea. The modernization of our high technology US Air Force and Navy is imperiled by inadequate Congressional support. Support has focused primarily on the ground war and homeland security with $400 Billion+. We are digging a strategic hole for the US as we mono-focus on counter-insurgency capabilities —while China inevitably emerges in the coming 15 years as a global military power. c. HEALING THE MORAL FISSURES IN THE ARMED FORCES: The leadership of Secretary Bob Gates in DOD has produced a dramatic transformation of our national security effort which under the Rumsfeld leadership was characterized by: a failing under-resourced counter-insurgency strategy; illegal DOD orders on the abuse of human rights; disrespect for the media and the Congress and the other departments of government; massive self-denial on wartime intelligence; and an internal civilian-imposed integrity problem in the Armed Forces—that punished candor, de-centralized operations, and commanders initiative. Admiral Mullen as CJCS and Admiral Fallon as CENTCOM Commander bring hard-nosed realism and integrity of decision-making to an open and collaborative process which re-emerged as Mr. Rumsfeld left office. (Mr. Rumsfeld was an American patriot, of great personal talent, energy, experience, bureaucratic cleverness, and charisma—who operated with personal arrogance, intimidation and disrespect for the military, lack of forthright candor, avoidance of personal responsibility, and fundamental bad judgment.) Secretary Gates has turned the situation around with little drama in a remarkable display of wisdom, integrity, and effective senior leadership of a very complex and powerful organization. General Petraeus now has the complete latitude and trust in his own Departmental senior civilian leadership to have successfully changed the command climate in the combat force in Iraq. His commanders now are empowered to act in concert with strategic guidance. They can frankly level with the media and external visitors. I heard this from many senior leaders — from three star General to Captain Company commanders. 3. THE END GAME: It is too late to decide on the Iraqi exit strategy with the current Administration. However, the Secretary of Defense and CENTCOM can set the next Administration up for success by getting down to 12 + Brigade Combat teams before January of 2009 —and by massively resourcing the creation of an adequate Iraqi Security Force. We also need to make the case to Congress that significant US financial resources are needed to get the Iraqi economy going. ($3 billion per year for five years.) The nation-building process is the key to a successful US Military withdrawal—and will save enormous money and grief in the long run to avoid a failed Iraqi state. Clearly we must continue the current sensible approach by Secretary of State Rice to open dialog with Syria, Turkey, and the Iranians—and to focus Arab attention with Saudi leadership on a US diplomatic offensive to mitigate the confrontation between Israel and the Arab states. We must also build a coalition to mitigate the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran. The dysfunctional central government of Iraq, the warring Shia/Sunni/Kurdish factions, and the unworkable Iraqi constitution will only be put right by the Iraqis in their own time—and in their own way. It is entirely credible that a functioning Iraqi state will slowly emerge from the bottom up…with a small US military and diplomatic presence holding together in loose fashion the central government. The US must also hold at bay Iraq’s neighbors from the desperate mischief they might cause that could lead to all out Civil War with regional involvement. A successful withdrawal from Iraq with the emergence of a responsible unified Iraqi nation is vitally important to the security of the American people and the Mid-East. We are clearly no longer on a downward spiral. However, the ultimate outcome is still quite seriously in doubt. Barry R McCaffrey General USA (Ret) Adjunct Professor of International Affairs Department of Social Sciences, USMA West Point, NY."

12/20/2007 2:42:52 PM

http://www.michaeltotten.com/

1/2/2008 10:10:38 AM

General Petraeus, Man of the year

]


[link]http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/news-flash-general-petraeus-man-of-the-year.htm[/link

1/7/2008 9:08:11 AM

http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2008/01/andy-olmsted.html

Here's a post from someone who blogged from Iraq. This is a post he had someone put up in case he died. Pretty moving stuff.

1/7/2008 11:36:53 AM

Really good entry in the British/Basra line of dispatches. One good quote

Quote :

"British and American officers frequently lament that Iraq has no reservoir of capable, strong leaders. They talk about the “reverse Darwinism” where the strong were killed or exiled. If the violence continues to decline, more can return. Former refugees already are streaming home."

Quote :

"Perhaps more promising for the long-term are the junior Iraqi leaders, still mostly in their twenties, who are being identified and mentored by US Army and Marines, and by British forces. It will be years before they can return serious dividends, but this is an unseen face of progress that does not translate well into news."

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/men-of-valor-part-v.htm

1/7/2008 3:22:08 PM

Dispatch is from Vermont.

1/8/2008 1:53:00 AM

Moment of truth in Iraq.

Good brief overview of his time in Iraq and defines some key moments in the war.

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/moment-of-truth-in-iraq.htm

1/8/2008 9:37:12 AM

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/media/pdf/Intsum/Intsum_16_Jan_08.pdf

Here is a daily intelligence summary from Iraq through Yon's site.

There is no key for the abbreviations but its nice to see now detailed and involved the military is with such things.

1/17/2008 3:52:40 PM

Update from one of the units Micheal embedded with.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/wp/commanders-update-9.htm

1/21/2008 6:01:12 PM

Al Qaeda in Iraq is being dismantled by American and Iraqi forces.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/01/al_qaeda_in_iraqs_sh.php



Al Qaeda in Iraq's area of operations from December 2006 to December 2007.





The reduction of violence in Baghdad from December 2006 to December 2007.



[Edited on January 24, 2008 at 9:20 AM. Reason : jj]

1/24/2008 9:19:39 AM

Quote :

"News Flash: Al Qaeda is on the run Major operations against al Qaeda have begun in northern Iraq. Al Qaeda is in serious trouble. These are not ad hoc operations, but are deliberate, systematic, well-planned and working. I’ve been watching this unfold for months but have not reported due to sensitivity, but the real shooting has started and Maliki has announced it. There is every indication that this series of operations could be the death blow for al Qaeda in Iraq. AQI can continue to murder people here and elsewhere for years to come, but their grip on Iraq is weakening faster than I can track. The Iraqis and Americans have seized the initiative. Al Qaeda is on the run. Due to these operations, I anticipate an increase in US casualties, but the operations are working. I’ll be in the middle of these operations bringing you the good, the bad and the ugly, from up close. "

-Michael Yon

I dont know about you guys, but I got dibs on Michael Yon being MY BOY!
dibs

anti quincies double stampies NO ERASIES!

1/29/2008 9:04:44 PM

http://www.michaeltotten.com/

Quote :

"Back at the main Fallujah police station, Sergeant Jason Howell pulled me aside. “What are you hearing from Marines about the Iraqis?” he said. “A whole range of opinion,” I said. “I probably hear the same things you hear. It doesn't sound to me like anyone censors themselves.” He clearly itched to say something to me on the record. I didn't know if it would be good or if it would be bad, but that didn't matter. I turned on my digital voice recorder. “I was here before,” he said. “This isn't my first time in the Fallujah area.” I knew then that he would say something good about the Iraqi Police. He has seen progress with his own eyes on two separate deployments. All the returning veterans I spoke to were on average more optimistic than the others. “You had the same job before?” I said. “Yes,” he said. “I was actually in Karmah.” Karmah is a smaller city about a ten minute drive (at normal speeds) from Fallujah toward Baghdad. It is sort of a suburb, and also a place unto itself. Every single Marine and MP said Karmah was more dangerous, violent, and terrifying than Fallujah. You probably have not even heard of it, but that's because journalists have not spent any time there. From the point of view of Americans who fought there or elsewhere in Anbar, Karmah might as well have been Mordor. “I was on a Police Transition Team,” he said. “We were the first embedded Police Transition Team that had taken over that station. When we started we had around 65 Iraqi Police, and when we left we had 94. We made a lot of progress. We improved the station. The biggest success we had there was the relationship we built with the Iraqis. This mission revolves around the relationships and friendships we make with these guys. They won't work with you unless they trust you, just like you won't work with them unless you can trust them.” “You trust them, then?” I said. “I do,” he said. “In general. There will always be some questions, just like in a police department back in the States. You won't necessarily know everybody that well or on that personal of a level. But in general I do trust these guys. They sacrifice a lot to do this job. I think a lot of people who come over here with a negative outlook, with a negative opinion of them, they don't think about the fact that they aren't just sacrificing their own safety. While they're out here doing this job, nobody is at home protecting their families. Their families are at home unattended, and they are constantly threatened. Coalition forces are obviously high-priority targets for insurgents, but another major priority is these Iraqi Police officers and their families. They risk a lot. They put a lot on the line to do this job.” “You seem more optimistic than some of the others I've talked to,” I said. “Is that because of your experience last year, or is there another reason?” “I had a very good experience last year,” he said. “We were fully embedded. We lived in the police station 24/7. I didn't leave the police station but once a month. I had very good relationships, life friendships, with my Iraqi Police officers. After all the things I've seen – they show you respect if you understand what they put themselves and their families through – it gives you a better understanding of the sacrifices they make.” “What do you think about the Iraqi Police who used to be insurgents?” I said. He laughed darkly. Clearly he did not want to talk about that. “There's some controversy about this in the U.S.,” I said. “A lot of people are worried that we are arming and training our enemies.” “Obviously if that happens, that's bad,” he said. “I've been lucky enough so far not to have experienced that. I haven't met any Iraqi Police who were insurgents. I've heard of that happening, but I haven't had that experience.” “What if you did meet an Iraqi Police officer who was an insurgent?” I said. “Would that bother you or be water under the bridge?” Some Marines really don't care all that much as long as the Iraqis are genuinely on their side now. So many Iraqis switched sides after the Anbar Awakening that it may not even be possible to keep all the former insurgents off the police force. It might even be foolish to try, just as dissolving the Iraqi Army after the invasion is widely seen now as a mistake. “If that happened,” Sergeant Howell said, “there would have to be some questions and further investigation. All I can really say is, thank God I haven't had to deal with that personally.” “So, what kind of progress have you seen?” I said. “What were the Iraqi Police like when you first got here compared to what they're like now?” “A lot of the guys in general have a lot of experience,” he said. “Whether it's policing or with tactics and patrolling operations. A lot these guys were in the Iraqi Army for 20 years before joining the police force. There are people who were medics in the Iraqi Army. And the good thing about these police stations is that the Iraqi Police are from the local towns. Soldiers in the Iraqi Army come from everywhere in the country. This really helps the Iraqi Police because they know all the civilians who live in these towns, just like in the small towns back home. This helps build trust between the police and the civilians.” What about the progress he's seen? “When we first got to our station last year,” he said, “the Iraqi Police were not being paid, they weren't really operating, and few bothered to show up for work. By the time we left, we had 94 Iraqi Police officers hired. They were being paid. They did show up for work. They were doing joint operations with us. They were going out into the city, talking to people. The biggest thing that helped us was our relationship with them, the friendships. I have to be honest with you. Saying goodbye was emotionally hard. I lived with these guys for seven months.” He choked up a bit and had to look away for a moment, lost in memories of something deeply personal and trying hard not to cry. An Iraqi Police officer in Karmah “I was lucky enough three weeks ago to go back to Karmah,” he said. “And my Iraqi Police were still there. The same guys from last year. As soon as I came into the station and they saw me they started jumping around, dancing, and yelling. There are four brothers who are all Iraqi Police at the Karmah station. One of the brothers was on shift when I got there. That night he called his brothers and his father – his father is a tribal leader – and they all came in the next day. Their father wanted to meet me.” He choked up again slightly and had to pull himself together. “So…there's a lot more to this mission,” he said. “If you go into everything with an open mind, you can take so many lessons out of this mission, not only with community policing and the mission at hand, but with human relationships in general.” I had heard this before. Maybe the majority of Americans who work closely with Iraqis feel something like this. Despite the corruption. Despite the incompetence. Despite the fact that some of them act like a bunch of third graders. The Iraqis really are brave, even if it doesn't look that way sometimes from far away or even up close. They are fighting for their survival in ways most Americans can barely imagine. Their enemy is possibly the most ferocious group of indigenous killers in the entire history of Mesopotamia. “We’ve actually become attached to these people on a personal level,” Army Colonel John Charlton said to me in Ramadi last summer. “We feel responsible for their safety. We’re concerned about what will happen to our Iraqi friends if we don’t succeed in this country.” "

[Edited on February 4, 2008 at 9:29 AM. Reason : sd]

2/4/2008 9:21:28 AM

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/media/pdf/TF_%202-7_%20IN_%20_Feb_%2008_%20Newsletter.pdf

2/4/2008 11:21:40 AM

Men of Valor: Part VIII of VIII

http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/men-of-valor-part-viii-of-viii.htm

2/6/2008 10:35:49 AM