all movies as an agenda from the get go. In the case of the failed anti-war movies, I think it is possibly the result of storyline not so much that it was anti-war. and I wasn't disagreeing with you.

[Edited on April 16, 2008 at 2:06 PM. Reason : .]

4/16/2008 2:05:37 PM

I agree.

Still think you should read that

4/16/2008 2:06:02 PM

cant we just let them live like they normally would and keep like 10k troops? 10k american troops is like worth a million chinks

4/16/2008 2:20:04 PM

meh, to much sabr rattling

4/16/2008 2:26:19 PM

Ha....hahaha.....hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaahahahahahaha

breath

hhaahahahahahaahahahaahahahahahahahahHahahaHAhAhahahahaAHAHAh

I knew they couldnt be that retarded

http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives2/2008/04/020368.php

Quote :

"April 24, 2008 Change you can forget about, Part Two Barack Obama has campaigned on the promise of "ending the war" in Iraq by withdrawing troops within 16 months. But Michael Crowley of The New Republic, after interviewing senior advisers to the Obama campaign as well as assorted foreign policy experts, has concluded that this pledge is close to a pipe dream. According to Crowley, what Obama "is offering is a basic vision of withdrawal with muddy particulars, one his advisers are still formulating and one that, if he is elected, is destined to meet an even muddier reality on the ground." This conclusion is consistent with a statement made by Samatha (Soft) Power, a close adviser to Obama whose big mouth and corresponding ego caused her ouster (and least for public purposes) from the campaign. Power said that Obama's withdrawal plan amounts to a "best- case scenario" subject to substantial revision when he takes office. In addition, Crowley notes, the New York Sun has reported that the leader of the Obama campaign's working group on Iraq has produced a paper proposing to leave 60,000-80,000 American troops in Iraq through 2010. Once again, perhaps, the "change" Obama has been peddling came out second-best in its encounter with reality. "

[Edited on April 25, 2008 at 9:10 AM. Reason : sda]

4/25/2008 9:10:34 AM

yep the bush admin has sucessfully created such a mess that it will be damn near impossible for anyone to clean it up....leaving the door open for the gop to effectively rail the dems for war mismanagement should one be elected to the whitehouse in '08, but "stay the course" if mccain gets it. It's pretty smart actually.

4/25/2008 9:38:32 AM

http://www.nypost.com/seven/05292008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/the_quit_iraq_time_travelers_112963.htm?page=2

This article is the target of the blog down below.

Quote :

"THE QUIT-IRAQ TIME-TRAVELERS Sadr: Lost big to forces of Iraqi democracy. May 29, 2008 -- CONTINUED * By the millions, Sunni Muslims turned against al Qaeda and turned to the US military, inflicting a catastrophic propaganda defeat on the terrorists. * Supported by the population, US and Iraqi forces inflicted a massive military defeat on al Qaeda. At present, the terror organization's own Web masters admit that al Qaeda is nearing final collapse in Iraq. Those are facts. If we nonetheless quit Iraq in 2009, the defeated remnants of al Qaeda will be able to declare victory, after all. The organization will be able to re-launch itself as the great Muslim victor over the Great Satan. We'll have thrown away a potentially decisive triumph and revived the fortunes of the fanatics who brought us 9/11. And the above only detailed the defeat of al Qaeda. Far more is happening in Iraq, all of it good: Muqtada al-Sadr and his thugs have suffered a series of lopsided defeats; Muqtada's hiding in Iran, afraid to return; a democratically elected government has finally taken charge in Baghdad - and gained enormously in popularity. Iraqis look forward to the next round of elections (to the dismay of every Persian Gulf autocracy). Crucial legislation has been refined, passed and implemented. Iraq's economy is booming - and its government has begun paying its own way. Want more good news? Iran has failed in its bid to take control of Iraq. And our military leaders are drawing down our troop levels according to a sensible plan, with the prospect of more troop cuts to come. What don't the critics like? Democracy? The defeat of al Qaeda? Muslims turning to the US military for help? Troop cuts? The dramatically improved human-rights situation? What's the problem here? The answer's simple: Admitting that they've been mistaken about Iraq guts the left's argument for political entitlement. If the otherwise deplorable Bush administration somehow got this one right, it means the left got another big one wrong. So be prepared for frequent time-machine trips until November. The encouraging reality of today's Iraq will go ignored in favor of an endless mantra of "Al Qaeda wasn't there in 2003 . . ." The bottom line? Al Qaeda let the war's opponents down. Ralph Peters' new book, "Looking For Trouble: Adventures in a Broken World," hits stores on July 4. "

http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/192864.php

Quote :

"We experienced the Americans through our brothers who went into combat against them in Somalia, for example. We found they had no power worthy of mention. There was a huge aura over America -- the United States -- that terrified people even before they entered combat. Our brothers who were here in Afghanistan tested them, and together with some of the mujahedeen in Somalia, God granted them victory. America exited dragging its tails in failure, defeat, and ruin, caring for nothing. America left faster than anyone expected. It forgot all that tremendous media fanfare about the new world order, that it is the master of that order, and that it does whatever it wants. It forgot all of these propositions, gathered up its army, and withdrew in defeat, thanks be to God. ---Osama bin Laden, October 2001"

Do the conclusions Peter reaches in his article warrent a long term presence in Iraq(but significantly reduced, duh)? That being just one reason to keep some there.

5/30/2008 9:36:48 AM

Who gives two shits what Al Qaeda thinks of whether we leave Iraq?

Who gave them the keys to the agenda?

Sounds like Ralph Peters has changed little in the last five years. More warmongering bullshit.

5/30/2008 4:57:11 PM

i think we should draw down to like 20k troops eventually

5/30/2008 5:17:27 PM

I guess if we do fully pull out of Iraq, the only way to counter the obvious propaganda, that will come as a result, is to counter it with propaganda of our own. Just be like, we never wanted to occupy, PEACE! which is true

I really dont see us not having some sort of force there for 5 more years. That agreement will be a huge deal though. The Iraqi government needs to be very careful about the language in the document and be very open with the people to placate any fears.

[Edited on May 30, 2008 at 5:22 PM. Reason : fs]

5/30/2008 5:21:07 PM

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/no-more-gazas-11464

Quote :

"No More Gazas Michael J. Totten Robert Dujarric and Andy Zelleke challenge Senator John McCain in the Christian Science Monitor. They ask three important questions that everyone in the United States ought to have answered before casting a vote in the November election. Senator McCain has yet to give the American people clear answers to three fundamental questions: What, exactly, are the political objectives of keeping large numbers of American soldiers in Iraq for years to come? What plausible outcome would benefit the United States enough to justify the wrenching costs of achieving those objectives? And what, concretely, is the strategy for getting there? I am not affiliated with the McCain campaign in any way and cannot be considered one of its spokesmen. These are important questions, however, and Senator McCain shouldn’t be the only one with some answers. First let’s get something out of the way. Not every war is fought for the purpose of achieving something good or creating something new that has never existed--an Arab democracy in Iraq, for example. Wars are also fought to maintain a status quo and to prevent a bad outcome. Dujarric and Zelleke are understandably skeptical about the emergence of a democratic Iraq friendly to the United States in light of Hamas's victory in the last elections in the West Bank and Gaza. But let’s set aside the fact that Iraq isn’t Gaza. Let's also assume, for the sake of argument, that Iraq will never be a light unto the nations or a shining city on a hill in the Middle East. Even if Iraq never becomes a model democratic state in the Arab world--which would benefit Americans and Arabs alike--far worse outcomes are possible than a limited victory, a stalemate, or even several more years of relative dysfunction and chaos. The worst case scenario would be, as Dujarric and Zelleke imply, the transformation of Iraq into a California-sized oil-rich Gaza. The quickest and most reliable way to get from here to there would be for the United States military to step out of the way now and let the most ruthless factions violently take over the country without interference. Iraqis are most unlikely to vote themselves into a Gaza scenario. The insurgent groups, remember, are those that lost the elections and can only acquire power through force. Even if an unambiguous victory is impossible in the short or medium term for the United States and the elected government of Iraq, a victory of any kind for Al Qaeda in Iraq or Moqtada al Sadr’s radical Mahdi Army militia is likewise impossible while American forces remain on the ground and in the way. To answer the first question, then, America’s primary political objective must be the prevention of a coup d’etat by Iranian proxy militias and Al Qaeda’s terrorist army. What plausible outcome would justify future costs? Any outcome other than that one. The Gaza scenario is the worst case scenario because it all but guarantees another war will be fought in Iraq by American soldiers. What’s the strategy for preventing that outcome? The current one. The new counterinsurgency strategy implemented by General David Petraeus is the only one that has ever worked in that country. It doesn’t need to be fixed, and it shouldn’t be modified. Levels of violence are at their lowest in years. Fallujah, Ramadi, Baqubah, and most parts in Baghdad were pacified last year. Much of Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul were pacified this year. Considerable political progress has been made toward reconciliation between the Sunni and Shia communities, in large part because both built trust with the other by turning against their own extremists. The war in Iraq is beginning to look less like a war and more like a rough-around-the-edges peacekeeping mission. Prematurely removing peacekeepers from the fragile and still-volatile country would, in all likelihood, reignite the war that is finally winding down. If Iraq still looked like a quagmire, as it did two years ago, a tactical retreat might be the right call. Retreating now, though, would be gratuitous. Every military and political gain made since the surge was implemented last year would be undone. And for what? What was once Iraq’s best-case scenario may no longer be possible. I don’t know, and neither does anyone else. The worst-case scenario, though, is all but impossible while American soldiers remain in Iraq--which is reason enough by itself for American soldiers to remain in Iraq. "

[Edited on June 18, 2008 at 4:08 PM. Reason : fsd]

6/18/2008 4:08:22 PM

http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/32714

Quote :

"Iraq and US: the Path of the Future By Amir Taheri -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 June 2008 (Asharq Alawsat) Print article Send to friendDetermined to set relations with Iraq on a clear course before he leaves office, US President George W Bush has thrown his weight behind negotiations over the modalities of the American commitment beyond 2008. The broad outline of an agreement was worked out at a meeting between Bush and the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki last November. Details, however, remain to be work out through intense negotiations that are already four months behind schedule. The United Nations' mandate under which the US-led coalition is in Iraq ends later this year almost at the same time as the Bush presidency. And it is clear that the 145,000 US troops still in Iraq will not, indeed cannot, be withdrawn by that time. Getting out is always harder than going in. The troop build-up for the Iraq war in 2003 took nine months to complete. To take the troops, and their heavy equipment, out could take twice as long, provided Iraq is peaceful and its government cooperative. With the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis, the US and its allies ceased to be occupying powers almost three years ago. Now they will lose their status under a UN mandate. So, what will the status of US troops be at the end of this year? It is almost certain that Bush is not seeking a formal military alliance with Iraq. Such a proposition, supported by some Iraqis, is opposed by significant segments of Iraqi opinion. It could divide the Iraqi political elite at a time it needs cohesion and unity. In any case, a US Senate controlled by the Democrats is unlikely to ratify a military pact negotiated by Bush. Thus the hue and cry made about Iraq being sucked into a network of military alliances, recalling the controversial Baghdad Pact of the 1950s, is misplaced. In recent years, US defense thinking has moved away from formal long-term alliances and towards what is known as "the coalition of the willing", that is to say case-by-case arrangements with foreign nations in response to specific situations. Currently, the US has formal alliances with 26 countries, all members of NATO, and specific arrangements for military cooperation with over 120 others. In fact, of the 193 members of the United Nations, a staggering 131 are either formal allies of the US or have some military agreement with it. One argument used by those who want the US to leave Iraq as fast as physically possible, thus leaving it exposed to the threat posed by its enemies, is that an American military presence would undermine Iraqi sovereignty. However, as already noted, two-thirds of the members of the United Nations host American military personnel, albeit in varying numbers. The US maintains over 700 full bases and more than 3000 other military facilities across the globe. The latter include hundreds of so-called " lily-pads", military facilities that could quickly be transformed into operational bases ready to use in case of war. None of the countries where the US maintains bases or other military facilities, from United Kingdom to Japan, and passing by Germany and Turkey, feel that their sovereignty is undermined. Some countries, like Taiwan and South Korea regard an American presence as an insurance policy against dangerous neighbors. Kosovo, the world's newest nation-state, is fighting hard to persuade the Americans to stay as guarantors of its hard-won independence. In any case, in recent years American strategic thinking has moved away from fixed bases in foreign countries. A programme of shutting down bases started in 2002, de-commissioning over 100 bases, mostly in Europe and Asia. But will the Americans try to keep some bases in Iraq? In 2004, the number of US bases of all shapes and sizes in Iraq reached almost 200. A year later, it had fallen to 105, as a programme of handing over to the new Iraqi army got under way. Since then, a further 28 bases have been transferred to Iraqi control, along with 10 of Saddam Hussein's 22 palace compounds. As things stand, it seems the US is planning to reduce the number of its bases even further, possibly ending up with just four in 2010. The largest is the multipurpose Camp Victory near Baghdad Airport, built with the latest design and equipped with ultra-modern materiel. In a sense, the three other bases, at Talil, south of Baghdad, Al-Assad in the Anbar province, and Qayyara near Erbil in the northeast, are complementary to Camp Victory. US troops also used to protect the 12 booster stations of the sophisticated Central Iraq Microwave Communication System for some time. It is up to Iraq's elected leaders to decide whether or not they still need an American military presence as an insurance policy. If they sincerely think so, they should say so openly and without forcefully. The people of Iraq should be fully informed about the contents and the form of the negotiations under way. They should also be reminded that the US has never tried to impose its military presence on unwilling hosts. In 1966, General Charles De Gaulle asked the Americans to close tier bases in France and leave. The US did so with top speed, although withdrawing tens of thousands personnel involved complex logistical issues. In 1969, Colonel Muammar al-Kaddhafi demanded the closure one of the United States' largest bases in the Mediterranean region, the Wheelus. Again, the Americans complied, despite the fact that Libya intended to hand the base over to the Soviets. Since then, the Philippines (1999), Saudi Arabia (2002) and Uzbekistan (2006) have demanded that the US to close military facilities and withdraw its personnel from. In every case, the US has complied. Thus the idea that the US could impose permanent bases against he will of the Iraqi people is fanciful, to say the least. In every case, bass used by the US are leased for fixed periods of time, renewable with mutual agreement. What Iraq needs to worry about is not bases which, in any case, cannot be but temporary. Far more important is the role that the US intends to plan in Iraqi politics. So far, the US has acted as a full partner in virtually all major decisions taken by Iraq's new leadership. It has also acted as an arbiter among various Iraqi communities and political factions. The US cannot, indeed should not, continue to play those two roles beyond the next Iraqi general election. New Iraq must take its own decisions and develop its own mechanisms for resolving communitarian and political conflicts. In other words, the problem cannot be solved through clenched fists and empty slogans during what is bound to be a difficult transition. "

6/20/2008 10:03:14 AM

http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/32732

Quote :

"Jokes and kebabs help hammer out strategic pact By Basil Adas -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Baghdad, 20 June 2008 (Gulf News) Print article Send to friendIn a secluded area inside Baghdad's fortified Green Zone, negotiators are using personal relations, jokes and kebabs to hammer out details of the strategic pact that could decide the future of Iraq. The negotiations between Iraqi officials and their US counterparts on the planned Status of Forces Agreement [Sofa] are being "conducted in a cosy atmosphere between friends who are used to each other and have worked together for many years," a high-ranking Iraqi officer in the Ministry of Defence told Gulf News. "I think this friendly atmosphere will help sort out the complicated issues and reach solutions." There are two accords being negotiated - a Strategic Framework Agreement to outline the long-term US-Iraqi security relationship, and Sofa, which would provide a legal cover for US troops in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki had said that initial efforts to reach the agreement have reached "a dead end," and negotiators are working on new approaches. The US hopes to sign the agreement by the end of July. Negotiators are meeting in more than one place inside the Green Zone, the Iraqi military official said. These houses are located inside the Republican Palace Compound of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussain, which is now completely controlled by the US army. "Only high-ranking Iraqi officials can enter, unlike the rest of the zone's areas where Americans, Iraqis and other foreigners can wander." The talks, the officer added, are being facilitated by the personal ties that bind the negotiators. "These meetings are always accompanied by lunches or dinners of the famous Iraqi dish 'Shish Kabab' because the US military officials and diplomats love this dish." He said meetings usually start in the mornings and finish in the evening. According to the Iraqi official, the security talks are attended by Iraqi president Jalal Al Talabani and his two deputies Tarek Al Hashemi and Adel Abdul Mahdi, and visited regularly by Al Maliki. "

6/20/2008 10:03:46 AM

http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/32660

Quote :

"The US should devise a new relationship with Iraq By David Ignatius -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 June 2008 (The Daily Star) Print article Send to friend"Don't be afraid of Iraqi sovereignty," General John Abizaid used to say when he was commander of US Central Command. And that's good advice now as Iraqis and Americans think about the new "status of forces" agreement that will shape the country next year when the Bush administration is gone. America should be looking, as Iraqis are, for a transition to a different kind of relationship. The time is ripe, at last, to think about a gradual withdrawal of most American soldiers. The US troop surge has had enough success in reducing the violence that we can say "Hallelujah!" or "Alhamdulillah!" and start to look for the exit ramp. Not a quick pullout, but not a long-term occupation either, premised on the false hope that Iraq can be an Arab version of South Korea or Germany. I've been helped in thinking about the future of Iraq by conversations over the past week with Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, a retired Australian Army officer and an expert in counterinsurgency. He was a key member of the team that drafted General David Petraeus' Iraq campaign plan. He was speaking in a private capacity at an academic conference sponsored by the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies - and he stressed that he was offering ideas about the future, rather than a critique of past or present strategy. Kilcullen's key point is that the United States need to use the breathing space the surge has created to transition to a presence in Iraq that is less costly and more sustainable. By congressional estimates, the US is spending about $400 million a day on the war; at that rate, we are walking into the trap Osama bin Laden described in 2004, when he said he wanted to draw us so deep into conflict that we would eventually leave the region exhausted and bankrupted, the way the Soviets departed Afghanistan. Kilcullen argues, as Abizaid did, that our heavy military occupation of Iraq has created enemies unnecessarily. It's human nature: People don't like to see another country's army patrolling their streets. It's the "antibody response," he says. "Our large-scale presence, although essential for current stability, also creates an angry reaction - and therefore can't be a permanent solution. We need to focus on what General Petraeus has called 'sustainable security.'" The alternative to our big, uniformed force in Iraq is a lighter, smaller, more nimble residual force. This force could concentrate on the tasks that most Iraqis and Americans seem to think are sensible - fighting Al-Qaeda terrorists and training the Iraqi military and other proxy forces. "Over the long run, we need to go cheap, quiet, low-footprint," argues Kilcullen. The continuing US presence in Iraq will depend on Special Operations Forces - both the so-called "black" SOF that will hunt terrorists, and "white" SOF that will train and fight alongside the Iraqis. We will also need a strong intelligence presence. As uniformed troops decline, the need for CIA paramilitary forces and case officers will increase. The right formula, says Kilcullen, is: "Overt De-Escalation; Covert Disruption." Indeed, our future Iraq presence may look more like covert action than traditional warfare. We've made a lot of friends among tribal leaders in the last several years, as the US finally began to learn the tools of counterinsurgency. Those relationships will be important in the next phase. A final, essential ingredient in this transition is diplomacy - including the clandestine variety. The next administration will want to explore with Iran whether it can find rules of the road in Iraq that protect each country's legitimate security interests. That kind of exploratory dialogue is often better done in private. A new administration won't want to talk publicly with terrorist groups, such as Hamas, Hizbullah and the Taliban, but there's no reason it shouldn't emulate Henry Kissinger - who authorized secret intelligence links with the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1974 even as the US branded it a terrorist group and refused to meet with its representatives openly. The presidential campaign debate about Iraq, so far, has been a sterile one - implying that the choice is between an Obama solution of pulling out the troops and a McCain solution of staying the course and winning military victory. Neither alternative is realistic. The right way out is something in between - ambiguous, messy, occasionally in the shadows - a course that recognizes Iraqi sovereignty but also works with care and cunning to protect America's interests. "

6/20/2008 11:16:32 AM

http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/32820

We should all now know where this is going.

Quote :

"Obama or McCain, a same priority in Iraq By Michael Eisenstadt -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 June 2008 (The Daily Star) Print article Send to friendThough committed to dramatically different Iraq policies, Barack Obama and John McCain - the presumptive Democratic and Republican presidential nominees, respectively - will likely be compelled to tread generally similar paths when one or the other is sworn in as president in January 2009. Obama has promised to start withdrawing US forces immediately upon taking office at the rate of one to two brigades per month. At this pace, US ground forces could be out of Iraq within 12-15 months of inauguration day. McCain, by contrast, has predicted that by the end of his first term in 2013 most US military personnel will have been withdrawn from Iraq. If, however, the security gains of the "surge" can be preserved, Obama would likely be subject to intense pressures by senior US generals and diplomats and key US allies to go slow with any prospective withdrawal and to leave a significant residual force in Iraq to secure the gains of the surge and deter renewed civil war. Moreover, it may not be possible to withdraw forces at the rate of one to two brigades per month while simultaneously conducting stability operations, without abandoning large quantities of munitions and equipment (thereby stoking any renewed civil violence) or destroying them in place. For these reasons, the pragmatic Obama will likely have to revise some of his Iraq campaign promises prior to or after elections. Conversely, McCain could be forced, for political and military reasons, to draw down forces quicker and deeper than he might prefer. As the surge ends and US forces in Iraq draw down, the central question becomes: Will the presence of fewer United States troops create new opportunities for those intent on attacking Iraqi civilians and coalition forces? Logic would seem to say yes; however, the statistics so far say no. Levels of violence have continued their dramatic downward march - though it may be too early to tell. There is, moreover, still much that could go wrong, with Kurds and Arabs in Kirkuk, Sadrists in Basra and Sadr City, and with the former insurgents of the Sunni Arab tribal awakening councils in Anbar province, Baghdad, and elsewhere. A rapid US drawdown entails the risk of renewed civil war. Obama has stated that he might consider intervening in the event of "genocide." This could ensure that US forces remain engaged in Iraq should the drawdown coincide with renewed sectarian or ethnic violence. On the other hand, renewed civil war could lead Washington to conclude that Iraq is a hopeless case, and to accelerate the withdrawal of US forces - regardless of who is president. A reduced US presence is likely to consist of several elements: special forces engaged in the hunt for Mehdi Army and Al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorists, transition teams training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces, and residual ground and air forces providing support and overwatch for the Iraqi Security Forces and protecting key US military and Iraqi government facilities in Baghdad and elsewhere. As it draws down, the US will likely increase its reliance on air power in conjunction with remaining US and Iraqi ground forces. In fact, the US is already moving in that direction, with a surge in air operations accompanying the surge in ground forces in 2007-2008. Increased emphasis, therefore, needs to be put on enhancing Iraqi intelligence gathering capabilities, improving US-Iraqi air-ground coordination, and refining tactics and procedures for targeting insurgents, sectarian militias and warlords from the air. Still, there is ultimately no substitute for effective Iraqi ground forces - and this will be the decisive factor in determining the implications for Iraq of the US drawdown there. Finally, it seems unlikely that the US and Iraq will sign status of forces (SOFA) or "strategic framework" agreements before the next US president takes office. These negotiations are shaping up to be a contentious affair, for historical as well as contemporary reasons. Under the monarchy (1921-1958), British influence in Iraq was formalized through two treaties: a 1922 treaty that provided for the appointment of British advisers to the Iraqi government and a 1930 treaty (signed shortly before independence) that allowed Britain to station troops and use air bases at Shuaybah and Habbaniya and permitted British forces to transit through Iraqi territory and made Iraq dependent on Britain for weapons and training. Britain's enduring influence and the privileges awarded it under these treaties were a matter of controversy in Iraqi domestic politics and a perennial source of tension between the crown and nationalist politicians. An attempt in 1948 to extend the 1930 treaty another 25 years led to widespread riots, the resignation of the Cabinet and the repudiation of the so-called Portsmouth Treaty by the new Iraqi government. There are cautionary lessons to be learned from elsewhere in the region as well. A 1964 SOFA agreement between the United States and Iran that granted legal immunity to US personnel and (unusually) their dependents produced a harsh anti-American backlash. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini condemned the agreement - acidly noting that the SOFA granted an American dog in Iran more rights than an Iranian citizen - and attacked the shah and the United States, leading to Khomeini's exile to Iraq. This was a key event in Khomeini's rise to prominence and power, and it is not hard to imagine some Iraqi politician using this issue to discredit establishment politicians and gain political advantage. Indeed, the ongoing negotiations have already provoked demonstrations by Sadrists (who are demanding that all agreements be put to a referendum), the intervention of Ayatollah Ali Sistani (who reportedly has insisted that any agreements be ratified by parliamentary vote) and the ire of Iranian officials (who have agitated against these agreements). Likewise, concerns that the Bush administration intends to commit the US to a long-term security relationship with Iraq without legislative approval have raised suspicions in Congress. For this reason, both sides might eventually conclude that it is more expedient to obtain another United Nations resolution, ensuring that this is one of the first issues the next administration will have to deal with upon taking office. Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter. "

6/23/2008 12:33:11 PM