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CHAPTER XXXVI
Sir Henry Bulwer's views on the state of Turkey in 1860
Sir Henry Bulwer, when first at Constantinople
in I860, wrote some very important letters to
Admiral Martin, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Mediterranean. These form a kind of epoch in
the history of Turkey, and, as all the parties
concerned are now dead, I think it may be wise
to publish the originals of Sir Henry Bulwer's
comments, as was desired by the writer.
Therapia, September 22, 1860.
My dear Admiral — I promised to write you some state-
ment on the affairs of Turkey : I will endeavour to do so, as
fully as I can, though hastily.
The fault of the old system of Turkish administration
was that it placed immense responsibility in the hands of
men in power, with life and death and confiscation of pro-
perty completely in their hands: they abused this power
and responsibility in as great a degree as men could well
abuse it ; and the Government also, which had the right of
condemning or approving their conduct, abused their own
power and responsibility also. Heads went off in all direc-
tions, with or without cause, and no man was certain for a
day together of his life> his estate, or his purse.
The reaction which followed towards milder measures
went just as much too far in the inverse direction. The
VOL. II 1 B
2 TURKISH FINANCES ch.
effect has been everywhere to cripple individual power, and
destroy individual responsibility ; and as everything in this
country, from long habit, depends on individuals, the effect
of a new system has been to destroy power everywhere.
The Pacha in the provinces has his authority confounded
with the Med j lis or Council, the one being able to throw
the blame on the other. Every affair at Constantinople is
referred to Councils, and no Minister can take the simplest
measure appertaining to his own department without the
Cabinet of Ministers discussing it or entering into it.
You may easily imagine why nothing is done, as well as
why no one is punished. Add to this, when the Turks were
induced to abandon their former laws and usages, no new
laws practicable under the circumstances were given to
them ; whilst a number of general principles were laid down
which the Turks naturally say should be applied in one way
and the Christians in another. In this manner the jealousy
it was intended to assuage has been immeasurably increased,
and confusion added to inaction and impunity.
Now as to finances. The expenses of Turkey have of late
years been immeasurably increased, partly by reforms in Army
or Navy : partly by wars, or the fear of war : and partly by
the corruption which the knowledge that no chastisement
awaited it was likely to encourage. A new feature in
Turkish finance, moreover, now became visible. Formerly
the Sultan spent what he had, and got what he could. Those
who became wealthy were so many sponges, squeezed out
on any occasion which called for the liquor they had sucked
into themselves. A great portion of trade, and nearly all
property, were moreover in the hands of Turks, who in great
emergencies were always ready to sacrifice what they had for
the sake of the representative of their race and their religion.
The indulgences and privileges furnished of late years to the
Christians have enabled them by their superior activity to
get almost the entire trade of Turkey into their hands:
they have become, much more than they were formerly,
landed proprietors : they pay with more unwillingness, and
their opposition is more formidable. Foreign loans came in
to aid this state of things, and the Turk, finding he could
xxxvi BORROWING 3
borrow money easily, spent it more lavishly. But with the
fin a nci a l system derived from Europe, they had no know-
ledge of managing, as Europeans manage, their finances
either in checking expenditure or collecting taxes. Thus
borrow ! borrow ! borrow ! was their only resource as
immediate payments became necessary; and this on those
terms by which the money wanted could most quickly be
procured. Thus the revenue was pledged for six months or
a year in advance; but as they who got it in from the people
lent it out again to the Government, things in a certain way
at least went on. When moreover the demands of Russia
created general apprehensions, lenders would lend no more,
and the Government stood with all its expenses going on
and no revenue for seven or eight months to come. Added
to this, the Government made a great mistake before I came
here, contrary to every rational motive. Having determined
on establishing a Bank, and recalling the paper money lately
discredited, they should of course have made use of the new
Bank to withdraw the discredited money. But instead of
this, they make an arrangement by which the new Bank is
not to issue for four months after the said paper money is
withdrawn. They create in this manner a difficulty both as
to withdrawing the paper money and starting the Bank.
And finally, when they do withdraw four millions of paper,
or more, from the circulation — without having anything else
to replace it by — they increase their difficulties instead of
alleviating them. Here we are consequently in a crisis : in
order to get out of it two things are wanting.
First, a loan to supply the six or seven months' current
revenue which are pledged, and without which the current
expenditure must stop ; and
Seamd, a series of measures which, by offering some hopes
of future improvement, will serve as a guarantee to those who
lend their money now ; and here is the question I have been
for some time past discussing with the Porte without getting
very near to a conclusion, whilst in the meantime things were
daily getting worse and worse. If there is not a loan, there
must, I fear, be a bankruptcy, which, without saying more,
would be a greater loss to English capital than the sum
4 TRIUMVIRATE OF STATESMEN ch.
which is now required to be advanced. I am trying, how-
ever, by various means, to get the Government through
their financial difficulties ; and if they will only act with the
least energy and decision, I shall do so.
Now as to the politics of persons. Aali Pacha is a
remarkably honest, well-informed, and intelligent man, but
without any decision of character. He is for the moment
temporary Grand Vizir.
The real Grand Vizir (who is, as you know, making a
circuit in the country) is honest, with no great capacity, but
great energy. Fuad's bon mot is that one is " all head " and
the other "all legs."
Fuad himself is a very remarkable man — fond of pleasure,
fond of affairs ; quick of intelligence, of considerable genius
and resources, and great momentary energy. But as Aali
Pacha can neither say " yes " nor " no," so Fuad's fault is that
he always says "yes" in some way or other: little fixed
principle, an over desire to conciliate, have given to his
character a greater outer colour of duplicity than it internally
possesses, though even his nature is not thoroughly straight-
forward. He looks to be Grand Vizir at some new crisis,
and went to Syria with that notion.
Rushdi Pacha, who was lately Grand Vizir and is now
employed in a sort of Financial Commission, is scrupulously
honest and painstaking, but his forte is in details. He
spends hours in some project to save a penny, without having
the mind to grasp some general project which would save
thousands.
Aali Pacha, Fuad Pacha, and Rushdi Pacha form a kind
of triumvirate, and would become, if united with the Grand
Vizir, exceedingly powerful, but cannot by itself hold its
ground against one man, who is decidedly the most powerful
man in the Empire.
This man is the Seraskier, Riza Pacha. He . . . ruled
the country during the Sultan's tender age with absolute
authority. Hated by the Sultan, in reality he has within
the last few years acquired an absolute power over his mind,
and this by a very simple expedient. He represents every one,
whom he himself has cause to fear, as in an intrigue to place
xxxvi DANGERS TO OTTOMAN EMPIRE 5
the Saltan's brother on the throne. In this manner he has
placed the Sultan's brother-in-law, the Capitan Pacha, a man
of some natural energy, but who is now completely cowed,
under surveillance; and on a late occasion, when I had to
complain of some abuses he committed, he even tried the same
ruse with me, and has in a similar manner deprived Omer
Pacha of all command. During the time of Lord Stratford, he
entered into a close and intimate alliance with the French
Embassy, of which I know the conditions, and that Embassy
will support him, whatever he does, at all hazards. It is
well to remember this, as it may have no small influence in
anything that may take place in Syria with respect to the
Turkish troops. By the army he is hated, nor has he ever
served as a soldier ; he has not instruction, but he has much
cunning, is utterly unscrupulous, very ambitious, a certain
force of character, an intimate acquaintance with all the
intrigues of Constantinople, and has adherents everywhere
posted in the palace. In short, he is a most dangerous
man both to the Sultan and the Empire, but he has amassed
great wealth, great influence, and is also a most dangerous
antagonist to any one who would wish to curtail his influence
or curb his power.  3/5/2013 8:11:04 PM
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